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Attractive supervisors: How does the gender of the supervisor 
influence the performance of the supervisees? 
 
 
Abstract 
A series of field and laboratory experiments were conducted in which single-sex groups of 
male or female students competed in different intellectual tasks to earn money or university 
grades (N = 291). The supervisor of these groups was one of several young and attractive 
males or females. The results show that when the supervisor was a female, the performance 
of male participants was, on average, negatively influenced. Group size moderated this effect 
such that having a female supervisor produced a negative effect in small groups and a 
positive effect in large groups of male supervisees.  
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1. Introduction 
Imagine a company that wants to hire the best possible new employees. The company 
uses an assessment center (Gaugler, Rosenhal, Thornton, & Bentson, 1987; Klimoski & 
Brickner, 1987) to achieve this objective. The applicants are typically male university 
graduates, and the company employs two human resource managers who typically supervise 
and evaluate the applicants in the assessment center. One of the human resource managers is 
a young woman; the other one is a young man. Both managers are very good at their jobs and 
happen to be physically attractive. Will the performance of the applicants be different if the 
assessment center is lead by the woman rather than the man? Could this lead to a biased 
evaluation of the candidates and a suboptimal hiring decision? 
Given the high practical relevance of these questions, it is surprising how little we 
know about mixed-sex supervision and its influence on the intellectual performance of the 
supervisees. 
In this study, we focus on a situation in which participants compete in an intellectual 
task, and the supervisor of the task is young and physically attractive, therefore stimulating 
mating desires in a mixed-sex situation. From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear how this 
type of supervision influences the intellectual performance of the supervisees. On the one 
hand, individuals may want to impress their supervisor and potential mate by their intellectual 
performance because intelligence is a highly preferred characteristic in sexual partners 
(Bruch, Gorsky, Collins, & Berger, 1989; Miller, 2001). A mating preference for intelligent 
partners would suggest that mixed-sex supervision has a positive effect on intellectual 
performance. On the other hand, it may be that leaving a favorable impression on the 
opposite sex (i.e., impression management) consumes a substantial amount of cognitive 
resources and energy (Karremans, Verwijmeren, Pronk, & Reistma, 2009; Vohs, Baumeister, 
& Ciarocco, 2005), thereby distracting individuals from the completion of intellectual tasks. 
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In this case, the predicted effect of mixed-sex supervision on intellectual performance would 
be negative. 
Prior research has shown that beauty and gender can have significant effects on 
earnings in the labor market (Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994) and on cooperation in public 
goods experiments (Andreoni & Petrie, 2008). Furthermore, mixed-sex interactions influence 
human behavior and points to significant differences between men and women in this respect. 
For example, research on risk behavior in mixed-sex situations has shown that men are more 
likely to make use of high-risk chess strategies when they play against women as opposed to 
a situation in which they play against men (Gerdes & Gränsmark, 2010). In a field 
experiment involving young, male skateboarders, Ronay and von Hippel (2010) found that 
physical risk taking (measured by the number of crash landings) increased when female 
observers were present. McAlvanah (2009) finds that both men and women are more likely to 
be risk-taking after having seen pictures of opposite sex faces. Furthermore, Wilson and Daly 
(2004) reported that men became more impatient (i.e., they applied higher rates to discount 
future payments) after having seen a photo of an attractive woman. Similarly, having seen the 
photo of a smiling female in the corner of an offer letter increased the probability of 
accepting the offer significantly in a large field experiment (Bertrand et al. 2007).  
Men generally seem more likely than women to perceive mixed-sex interactions as 
mating games and are therefore more likely to engage in efforts to impress the opposite-sex 
interaction partner (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Griskevicius, Tyunur, Sundie, 
Cialdini, Miller, & Kenrick, 2007). Do these findings carry over to intellectual performance? 
If so, would the effects of mixed-sex supervision be positive or negative? 
To analyze these research questions, we conducted several incentive-compatible 
(Smith, 1982) experiments in the laboratory and in the field (Harrison & List, 2004) in which 
single-sex groups of male or female students competed in different intellectual tasks. 
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Incentive compatibility in our experiments means that all participants had clear, well-
understood incentives to perform as best as they could in the intellectual tasks we gave them; 
we used either money or university grades as motivation for good performance. The 
supervisors in our experiments were young, attractive strangers. In the treatment (control) 
group, the supervisor was of the opposite (same) sex. The supervisees and the participants 
were assigned randomly to either control or treatment groups. 
Our study is the first to examine the influence of mixed-sex interaction on intellectual 
performance in a formal supervision setting in which the supervisor provides the participants 
in the experiment with feedback about their intellectual performance. Furthermore, our study 
is unique in investigating this topic in a set-up that measures intellectual performance in a 
competitive situation resembling real world situations, such as those that occur at assessment 
centers or during exams in schools and universities. As robustness checks, our experimental 
design deliberately makes use of different male and female supervisors, varies group size and 
intellectual tasks, uses both artificial laboratory and naturally occurring experimental 
situations in the field, and employs real incentives for participants to perform well in the 
intellectual task.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
experimental designs. The section that follows presents the empirical analyses. The final 
section discusses our results in light of existing literature, derives practical implications, and 
concludes. 
 
2. Methods 
We conducted three experiments with different participants. We carried out two of the 
experiments in a laboratory in which participants solved Sudoku puzzles (hereafter referred to 
as Sudoku experiments). The third experiment was a field study in the form of a multiple-
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choice practice exam at a university (hereafter referred to as exam experiment). The number 
of participants in each experiment is reported in Table 1. 
All sessions consisted of either young male or female participants, who were randomly 
allocated to either the control or the treatment groups. All participants except one were 
students. The mean age of participants was 22 years, ranging between 17 years and 38 years. 
In the treatment groups, the supervisor of the experiment was an attractive, young person of 
the opposite sex. For example, the male treatment groups had an attractive female supervisor. 
In the control groups, the supervisor was an attractive young person of the same sex. Hence, 
the control groups were single-sex environments, while the treatment groups created a mixed-
sex environment through the supervisor. Overall, six supervisors were involved in the 
experiments, and all of them were graduate or undergraduate students who were 
unacquainted with the participants. Overall, there were 291 participants, and 55% of them 
were men. 
>> Table 1 about here << 
We measured intellectual performance with one of two different tasks. We asked the 
participants to either complete two Sudoku puzzles as fast as possible or to participate in a 
multiple-choice practice exam in a graduate level course in Economics. Sudokus are logic-
based, combinatorial number-placement puzzles. The Sudokus we selected for the experiment 
are a relatively simple intellectual task that, when given a short introduction, does not require 
any additional previous knowledge. In addition, experiments using Sudoku puzzles offer a 
natural, self-controlling mechanism because the person solving them can check them easily 
for correctness. The performance of each subject can be measured by the time needed for 
completion. Undoubtedly, multiple-choice exams are a standard way to measure intellectual 
performance in schools, universities, and in standardized tests, such as the GRE or GMAT. In 
contrast to solving Sudoku puzzles, however, success in such exams requires previous 
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learning efforts and specialized knowledge. The students who participated in the exam 
experiment knew about this condition because the exam was part of a course in which they 
had enrolled earlier. 
The experiments were carried out in a large public European university. The first round 
of Sudoku experiments was conducted in June 2009. The experiments were then repeated 
with different participants and different supervisors in February 2010 to determine if the 
preliminary results obtained in the first round of experiments would replicate in a larger 
sample and with different supervisors. The supervisors of the second series of Sudoku 
experiments were also supervisors in the exam experiment in October 2009. Hence, potential 
differences between the second round of Sudoku experiments and the exam experiment could 
be due to the type of the intellectual exercise, but not due to different supervisors. In every 
session, the supervisors adhered strictly to a detailed time and task schedule to reduce a 
potential influence that may result from different behaviors across treatments. Moreover, the 
supervisors were told to behave in a friendly but professionally distant manner toward the 
participants. The supervisors evaluated the intellectual performance of the participants in all 
experimental conditions and provided everyone with individual feedback about their 
performance. We informed all the participants of this condition before beginning the 
experiments. 
The number of participants varied between sessions. In the first set of Sudoku 
experiments in June 2009, the number of participants per session varied between 3 and 6 
(mean 4.5). In the second set of Sudoku experiments in February 2010, we also investigated 
larger groups, and the number of participants per session varied between 2 and 12 (mean 6.7). 
We introduced the variation in group size to test if the effect of the treatment on intellectual 
performance depended on the number of competitors participants faced. In the exam 
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experiment, the number of participants per group was derived externally from the number of 
male and female students who had enrolled in the course. 
All experiments were incentive-compatible, meaning that better intellectual 
performance was always rewarded, the rewards were substantial, and the incentive structures 
were explained clearly at the beginning of the experiments. All participants understood that 
better intellectual performance would increase their rewards. 
In the Sudoku experiments, participants received money as a reward for good 
performance. In addition to an attendance fee of five Euros given to everyone, the participant 
solving the Sudoku experiment fastest in a session earned an additional five Euros, while 
relatively slower participants received correspondingly lower payoffs. The slowest participant 
in every session did not receive any additional payment. Accordingly, the last participant 
usually stopped solving the Sudoku experiment once the second last participant to finish gave 
a signal. Typically, we obtained n - 1 results per experimental session. The financial rewards 
were scaled proportionately by group size such that the group size did not influence the 
money that participants could earn, given their specific percentile rank of performance. 
Hence, the incentives for intellectual performance in the experiments were independent from 
group size. 
We recruited participants for the Sudoku experiments by advertising the experiment at 
the university through flyers, posters, word of mouth and class announcements in an 
undergraduate course in economics. We did not communicate the purpose and content of the 
experiment to any potential subject prior to the sessions, and we announced the experiment 
neutrally as an “economic experiment.” Participants who were interested registered online 
and selected a timeslot for participation. We conducted 48 experimental sessions overall. We 
scheduled every session for one hour. On average, participants needed less than 30 minutes to 
complete all tasks and collect their payment. 
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In the exam experiment, participants could receive bonus points for the course in which 
they had enrolled. Every participant in the course could earn up to 100 points in the regular 
final exam of the course. In addition, depending on the number of correct multiple-choice 
responses they provided, students who participated in the experimental practice exam could 
earn up to 10 extra points that would be added to their final grade. The course and the exam 
were relatively difficult for students such that no student received more than 90 points in the 
final exam. For most students, the course was required for their Masters of Economics degree 
program. Students anticipated that the exam would be difficult and saw the practice exam as a 
welcome opportunity to improve their final results. Almost all students who participated in 
the final exam also participated in the practice exam and the experiment. 
In the exam experiment, the grades that the participants could receive did not depend on 
the size of the group. Therefore, performance differences between groups of different sizes 
cannot be explained by different incentives for intellectual performance in any of the 
experiments we conducted (neither Sudoku experiments nor exam experiments). 
We conducted the different experimental treatments in separate rooms. In the Sudoku 
experiments, all participants met in a registration room at the beginning of their session. 
Upon arrival, the participants were welcomed in the preparation room by a student assistant 
and randomly assigned to either the treatment or the control group by drawing lots. 
Subsequently, a student assistant accompanied the group to one of the experimental rooms. 
The experimental environment and the experimental procedure were exactly the same for all 
sessions. We began the actual experimental phase by asking the supervisor to read the 
instructions out loud while the participants read along in their own copies. Afterwards, the 
instructor gave them three minutes to read through the instructions on how to solve a Sudoku 
puzzle. Once this time expired, the instructor gave the participants the signal that allowed 
them to open the Sudoku envelopes and start solving them. Participants were asked to raise a 
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red card upon solving their Sudoku puzzles. The instructor monitored each participant’s time 
with a digital watch. While gathering the Sudoku puzzles to check for correctness, the 
instructor handed out a questionnaire. The instructor then asked the participants to complete 
the questionnaire and to put it inside an envelope, seal it, and then hand it back to the 
supervisor. Finally, the participants were sent back to the preparation room with a voucher to 
receive their payments. They acknowledged receipt of their payments in the preparation 
room. 
In the exam experiment, we formed four groups a few days before the practice exam 
took place using the last name of students as a randomization device to split them into equally 
sized control and treatment groups, one each for men and for women. We conducted the four 
resulting sessions at the same time in four different rooms at the university, and one day prior 
to the exam via email, the students were informed of which room they should show up for the 
practice exam. Identical to the Sudoku experiments, the exam experiment started with the 
supervisor reading out the instructions. Students had two envelopes on their table: a large 
envelope that contained the practice exam and a small envelope that contained a 
questionnaire. After the supervisor read out the instructions, students opened the practice 
exam and had two hours of time to complete the exam. All students finished within two 
hours, and the time needed to complete the exam did not influence their grades. The students 
put completed exams back into the large envelope, and the supervisor picked them up.  
Students then had the choice to also complete the questionnaire in the small envelope. 
They were not required to fill out the questionnaire, but if they did, they earned five Euros in 
addition to the course credit, and their responses and exam result would be included in this 
study. All students decided to complete the questionnaire and opted for participating in the 
experiment. When everyone was finished, the supervisor collected both envelopes from all 
participants and asked them to wait outside for their exam results. The supervisor then graded 
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all exams and informed all students individually about their results. The supervisor explained 
this procedure as part of the instructions read out loud before the exam started. 
In the additional questionnaires that were collected, participants were asked about their 
age, educational background, relationship status, working status, previous experience with the 
intellectual task, and several opinion statements, including their motivation for the 
experiment and whether they found themselves physically attractive, intelligent and diligent. 
The exam and the second set of Sudoku experiments also included a short measure of 
personality (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). We used all these additional variables for 
randomization control across treatments by computing a matrix of bivariate correlation 
coefficients between all available variables. Only the variable occupational status correlated 
significantly with both intellectual performance (r = -0.13, p = 0.03) and with the treatment 
dummy (r = 0.14, p = 0.02). However, adding this variable to the multivariate regressions 
reported below did not influence the results in a substantial way.  
In addition, we included questions about whether the participants viewed the 
experimental supervisor as attractive and whether they would go out with the supervisor on a 
romantic date if asked. Participants understood that the supervisor would never see their 
responses to the questionnaire, that the questionnaire was anonymous, and that the 
questionnaires were only linked back to the experimental performance much later not by the 
supervisors but by researchers by means of the participant’s number for the experiments (not 
by their names or student IDs). The experimental instructions and questionnaires are included 
in the Appendix of this paper. 
To compare the results across the three experiments and to pool observations for 
statistical analyses, we transformed the time needed to solve the Sudoku puzzles and the 
number of mistakes or unanswered questions in the multiple choice exam (out of 15) into z-
scores using 
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where i is the subject (i = 1,...,N), s stands for the Sudoku experiments, e stands for the 
exam experiment, µ is the sample mean, and σ is the standard deviation of the sample. 
Participants who made mistakes in solving the Sudoku puzzle or who finished last in their 
group are excluded from the computation of the z-scores and all further analyses. Z-scores 
have, by construction, a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. To ease the 
interpretation of the statistical results, we adjusted the sign of z in the formula above such that 
a high z-score corresponds to a high rank in intellectual performance compared to others in 
the sample and vice versa. A z-score of zero implies an average performance. The best and 
the worst performer in our experiments have z-scores of 2.68 and -4.59, respectively. The 
median performance was 0.26, which implies a slight negatively skewed performance 
distribution (skewness = -1.37), which results from a few participants who spent a 
disproportionately long time solving the Sudoku puzzles. 
 
3. Results 
In summary, our analyses show that the effects of mixed-sex interaction on intellectual 
performance were different for men and women and that the effects were moderated by the 
size of the group in which the participants competed against each other. Men demonstrated 
better intellectual performance in small groups compared with large groups. In small groups, 
the presence of a female supervisor had strong, negative effects on the intellectual 
performance of male supervisees. In large groups of men, however, the presence of a female 
supervisor reduced the negative effects of group size and increased average intellectual 
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performance. These effects were particularly strong for groups supervised by a particularly 
attractive female (a semi-professional model). For women, the effects of having a male 
supervisor were weaker and often insignificant.  
Table 2 reports the results of OLS regressions on intellectual performance. The results 
show significant treatment effects for men (p = 0.07) and insignificant effects for both 
women (p = 0.86) and the pooled samples of men and women together (p = 0.23). When they 
were supervised by an attractive female, the intellectual performance of men was 0.31 
standard deviations worse on average. 
>> Table 2 about here << 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of OLS regressions investigating whether these main 
effects hold for all supervisors of the opposite gender, regardless of group size. For this 
purpose, in the regression, we control for the identity of opposite sex supervisors instead of 
using a dummy variable for the treatment groups. We also estimate this model separately for 
participants in small groups and large groups. A Chow-test (Chow 1960; Gujarati 1970) 
reveals that the effects of the experimental treatment are significantly different for men and 
women in small groups (p = 0.03). 
Table 3 shows the results for male participants. The performance decreasing effect only 
occurs for one of the two female supervisors and only in small groups. Although all 
supervisors were young, physically attractive and well dressed, the female who caused the 
negative effect in small groups happened to be a semi-professional model who had performed 
in various fashion shootings and shows. This female supervisor was perceived as even more 
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attractive than the others.
1
 In large groups, if observations from the exam and the Sudoku 
experiment are analyzed jointly (pfemale1 = 0.48 and pfemale2 = 0.21), then being supervised by a 
female has a non-significant, performance increasing effect on men. 
A comparison of the constants in the regressions for small and large groups shows that, 
after controlling for the supervisor and the exact number of group members, intellectual 
performance was significantly below average in large groups and above average in small 
groups. This finding is peculiar because the incentives to perform well in the experiment 
were held constant for each percentile of the performance distribution (see payoff tables of 
the experimental instructions in the Appendix).  
A possible explanation for this finding is that men may attach value to being the winner 
or top performer in a competition (Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2004). The satisfaction of winning a competition may provide additional pride 
and motivation to perform well that go beyond the direct incentives for top performance 
induced by the experimental design. The chances to come out on top obviously decrease with 
the number of competitors. Hence, men in larger groups may lack the additional motivation 
of trying to perform well for the sake of winning, which may decrease the average 
performance in larger groups. In this situation, our results show that being supervised by an 
attractive female can restore some of the motivation to perform well. This effect is expected 
to be particularly strong if the incentives for good performance are otherwise relatively low, 
such as in the Sudoku experiment. 
>> Table 3 about here << 
                                                 
 
1
 Out of all supervisors, this female supervisor scored the highest among subjects in the question “I find the supervisor of 
this experiment is good looking”.  
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To investigate this possible interaction effect between group size and supervision by a 
female in a low incentive situation, Figure 1 focuses on the intellectual performance of men 
in the second Sudoku experiment. In this experiment, female 1, the model, supervised all 
male participants in the experimental treatment group. Furthermore, we varied the group size 
systematically so that the effect of female 1 on the performance of men in groups of very 
different sizes could be compared directly. 
The significant interaction effect between treatment and group size displayed in Figure 
1 suggests that the negative effects of being in a large group on performance are compensated 
for if the female model supervises men. Apparently, the presence of a very attractive potential 
mate has a disciplining effect on men in large groups that impedes them from a lackadaisical 
performance to some extent. On the other hand, Figure 1 also illustrates the negative effect of 
having an attractive female supervisor in small groups. 
>> Figure 1 about here << 
Finally, Table 4 reports the results for women. In the pooled regression, none of the 
male supervisors had a significant influence on the intellectual performance of female 
participants. In small groups of female participants, male 2 had a slightly performance 
decreasing effect. Male 2 received slightly higher attractiveness ratings from the female 
participants than male 1
2
. This result corresponds to our findings for male participants in 
Table 3, although the effect size for female participants is considerably smaller. In contrast to 
the results for male participants, for the females in large groups who were supervised by a 
                                                 
 
2
 Based on the question “I find the supervisor of this experiment good looking”. 
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man, we did not find evidence for a performance increasing effect. Only the most attractive 
female and male supervisors had significant effects on the performance of supervisees of the 
opposite gender, suggesting that this gender effect is indeed driven by perceived physical 
attractiveness and mating desires. 
>> Table 4 about here << 
We estimated a variety of alternative model specifications to test the robustness of our 
main results. The qualitative results of the regressions did not change when we included self-
reported measures of how attractive the supervisor was perceived, romantic intensions of 
participants towards the supervisor or the type of intellectual task (exam or Sudoku). If we 
analyze the original performance measure (seconds needed to solve the Sudoku experiments) 
instead of z-scores, we obtain similar results, although some of the coefficients become 
insignificant due to the smaller sample size.  
 
4. Discussion 
Research has shown that the exposure of men to attractive women can lead men to 
demonstrate their own mating value to the women (Griskevicius et al., 2007; Janssens, 
Pandelaere, van den Bergh, Millet, Lens, & Roe, 2011; Sundie, Kenrick, Griskevicius, Tybur, 
vohs, & Beal, 2011). One way of doing so would be by performing well in the test and 
beating the competitors, which demonstrates one’s intellectual ability. If this is the case, the 
presence of the attractive potential mate should motivate men, along with monetary or grade 
incentives, to perform well in the test, and should also have a positive impact on intellectual 
performance. 
However, there are also other ways to impress potential mates by appealing to common 
mating preferences, such as displaying humor, high social status in the group, or sympathy 
(Buunk, Dijkstra, Fetchenbauer, & Kenrick, 2002; Buss & Barnes, 1986; Buss, 1988; 
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Feingold, 1992; Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, & Simonson, 2006; Townsend, 1989). The 
above strategies would influence performance negatively in the intellectual task at hand 
because such activities exhaust the limited amount of cognitive resources people have 
available (Karremans et al., 2009). This negative effect is similar to the negative effect that 
noise pollution has on intellectual performance as a result of people’s attempts to cope with 
the distraction (Weinstein, 1974, 1977). If participants have the conscious or unconscious 
desire to increase their mating chances, they face a trade-off between different conflicting 
strategies to achieve this goal. 
Furthermore, a distraction may also occur even if the participants do not consciously or 
unconsciously try to impress the attractive potential mate and simply gaze at the supervisor 
instead of focusing on the test. In the language of Economics, such gazing is similar to 
consumption in that it raises individual utility and enjoyment. Again, there is a clear trade-off 
between engaging in such consumption by just enjoying the sight for a moment and the 
investment into increasing mating chances by performing well on the test. If this decision is 
made consciously, one would expect to see more “investment” in small groups and more 
“consumption” in large groups because the expected returns to investing would be lower in 
large groups due to greater competition from other potential mates. However, our empirical 
results in Table 3 and Figure 1 are not consistent with that interpretation. Instead, we observe 
the opposite: under female supervision, men perform better in large groups than in small 
groups. One possible explanation is that men take the number of competitors into account and 
adjust their impression management strategies to impress the female supervisor. In small 
groups, it is easier for men to be noticed by the supervisor, to establish eye contact, and to 
display desirable attributes that would increase their mating chances such as humor, social 
status, or kindness. In large groups, it becomes more difficult to be noticed personally for 
characteristics other than intellectual performance, on which participants received personal 
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feedback from the supervisor. It is possible that men tried to play to their “natural strengths” 
in small groups at the expense of their intellectual performance but recognized that good 
performance was their only way to get attention in large groups.  
Overall, the men in our experiment were more strongly affected in their intellectual 
performance by the experimental treatment than women, which is in line with the findings of 
prior studies (Griskevicius et al., 2007; Janssens et al., 2011; Karremans et al., 2009; Sundie 
et al., 2011). There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, it is possible that 
men have stronger desires to attract a potential mate and therefore react stronger to the 
presence of mating cues. Second, the possible interaction between participants and 
supervisors in the experiment was very limited and therefore put a greater weight on the 
physical attractiveness of the supervisor as a potential trigger of mating desires. This situation 
made it more likely that men would respond to the experimental treatment because men 
generally put greater emphasis on physical attractiveness of their potential mates than women 
do (Buunk et al., 2002; Fisman et al., 2006; Townsend, 1989). Third, it is possible that the 
supervisors from the opposite sex were perceived as more attractive by the male participants 
than by the female participants. Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder, and perhaps the (male) 
experimenters were more successful in anticipating the male participants’ preferences when 
they recruited the supervisors for this study. Regardless, the physical attractiveness ratings 
that male 2 (3.5) and female 1 (3.8) received from the supervisees of the opposite sex did not 
differ significantly. Nevertheless, the result that men react more strongly to mating cues than 
women do should not be generalized.  
Our experimental design and results do not relate directly to research investigating the 
influence of gender diversity on performance of teams (van Knippenberg, Dreu, & Homan, 
2004, Ivanova-Stenzel & Kübler 2011). We studied a situation in which participants 
competed against each other in a test situation (that is not repeated) that does not allow for 
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any interaction between participants during the test. Team performance, on the other hand, 
usually requires extensive collaboration over a longer time period with the joint goal of 
maximizing the performance of the team rather than being in direct competition with other 
team members. Furthermore, the gender diversity in our study is limited to the gender of the 
supervisor of a group of participants of the same sex; in group performance studies, there is 
usually no supervisor, and diversity refers to the entire group of participants. In contrast to 
our study, research on team performance often finds a positive effect of gender diversity 
(Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeck, & van Praag, 2011; Wegge, Roth, Neubach, Schmidt, & Kanfer, 
2008) and suggests that the influence of gender diversity on team performance is moderated 
by the incentive scheme (Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler, 2011), the elaboration of task-relevant 
information in multiple interactions among team members (van Knippenberg et al., 2004) and 
the type of conflicts that emerge over time (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). In our study, 
participants could not elaborate on task-relevant information with others, and there was no 
scope for conflicts or conflict management. 
Our findings have important practical implications. In real life, people often face test 
situations similar to those found in our experiment, and often these test situations, such as 
exams at the university or participation in assessment centers, have far-reaching 
consequences (Gaugler et al., 1987; Klimoski & Brickner, 1987). Our results suggest that 
presenting participants with an attractive supervisor of the opposite sex can bias measures of 
cognitive performance to the disadvantage of some participants and the organizations that are 
trying to measure the intellectual aptitude of their applicants accurately. The moderating 
effect of group size implies that the presence of an attractive female supervisor can have a 
disciplining effect on large groups of men competing against each other in a cognitive task. 
Because being in a large group can reduce motivation (Jones, 1984), the presence of a 
potential mate can help to restore motivation to perform well in large groups. This seems 
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particularly relevant in situations in which the stakes are not high such that being in large 
groups would indeed reduce the motivation of men to perform well. Some examples include 
training situations in firms or occasional tests in schools and universities that do not have a 
large influence on final evaluations. 
In conclusion, we found that the gender of the supervisor and group size are important 
moderator variables for the intellectual performance of supervisees. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Number of participants across experiments 
 Men Women  
 Sudoku 1 Sudoku 2* Exam* Sudoku 1 Sudoku 2* Exam*  Total 
Control 26 29 27 33 17 14 146 
Treatment 30 28 19 31 28 9 145 
 
Total 
 
56 
 
57 
 
46 
 
64 
 
45 
 
23 
 
291 
Note: * indicates that the same supervisors conducted the experiment.  
 
 
Table 2: The effect if mixed-sex interaction on intellectual performance 
 Pooled sample Men only Women only 
 Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Treatment -0.16 (0.13) -0.31* (0.17) 0.04 (0.20) 
Constant 0.08 (0.10) 0.13 (0.12) 0.01 (0.14) 
 
Model Diagnostics 
 
N 232  132 100 
Prob > F 0.23  0.08 0.86 
R² 0.01  0.02 0.00 
Notes: The table shows OLS regressions on z-scores of relative 
performance.  
*** denotes 0.01 significance level. 
** denotes 0.05 significance level. 
* denotes 0.1 significance level. 
Observations relating to subjects who had mistakes in the Sudoku are 
excluded. 
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Table 3: The effect of female supervision on male intellectual performance: group size as a moderator 
 Men Men, groups of less than 6 Men, groups of more than 5 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female 1 -0.45** (0.19) -1.61*** (0.37) 0.17 (0.24) 
Female 2 0.00 (0.26) -0.30 (0.28) 0.65 (0.51) 
Group size 0.00 (0.01) -0.29 (0.19) 0.03 (0.02) 
Constant 0.10 (0.19) 1.63** (0.79) -0.81** (0.36) 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 132  52  80  
Prob > F 0.11  0.00  0.19  
R² 0.04  0.30  0.06  
Notes: The table shows OLS regressions on z-scores of relative performance.  
*** denotes 0.01 significance level. 
** denotes 0.05 significance level. 
* denotes 0.1 significance level. 
Observations relating to subjects who had mistakes in the Sudoku are excluded. 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of male supervision on female intellectual performance: group size as a moderator 
 Women Women, groups of less than 6 Women, groups of more than 5 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Male 1 0.57 (0.49) 0.49 (0.39) - - 
Male 2 -0.22 (0.25) -0.54* (0.34) -0.04 (0.37) 
Male 3 0.31 (0.29) 0.18 (0.25) 0.57 (0.82) 
Group size 0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.16) 0.04 (0.06) 
Constant -0.17 (0.27) -0.21 (0.68) -0.48 (0.75) 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 100  52  48  
Prob > F 0.46  0.22  0.87  
R² 0.04  0.11  0.02  
Notes: The table shows OLS regressions on z-scores of relative performance.  
*** denotes 0.01 significance level. 
** denotes 0.05 significance level. 
* denotes 0.1 significance level. 
Observations relating to subjects who had mistakes in the Sudoku are excluded. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Experiment 3 – The moderating effect of group size in the relationship between female 
supervision and male intellectual performance 
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Notes: Small groups have 2 to 6 participants, large groups have 7 to 12 participants. Means are significantly 
different between control and treatment groups for small (t = -2.72) and large groups (t = 1.97). Female 1 was 
the only female supervisor in experiment 3. 
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Online Appendix  
A1 - Experimental instructions - Sudokus 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s experiment. At the end of the session you will be paid in cash 
for your participation.  
 
All participants of the experiment will receive a show-up reward of €5. Different participants may earn an 
additional amount of money, ranging from €1 to €5 depending on the number of participants per experiment and 
their achievement during the experiment. Although there are at most 12 people participating in the experiment, 
everyone is working independently. This means that your earnings are based entirely on your performance 
relative to the performance of the other participants. Do not talk or in any way communicate with other 
participants from now on. Do not open the envelope in front of you yet. Please turn off your cell phones. If you 
have a problem at any point in the experiment, please raise your hand.  
 
In the envelope in front of you, you will find two Sudokus that you have to solve once the experiment has 
started. The time you need to solve the Sudokus will be measured. Once you have completed both sudokus, raise 
the red card lying on your table. To guarantee the comparability of all experimental sessions, questions 
concerning how to solve the Sudokus will not be answered at any point of the experiment. Please remain seated 
and remain quite when you are finished.  
 
When everyone is finished, the supervisor will collect your Sudokus to check them for correctness and ask you 
to complete a short anonymous questionnaire. After this, you will receive a voucher that you can cash in at the 
registration room after the session. Please remain seated and quite until all participants are finished and the 
supervisor gives a sign that you are allowed to leave the room.  
You will be paid according to your performance in solving the Sudokus relative to the other participants.  
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Small group sessions 
Ranking / 
Participants 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
3 5 € 3 € 0 €    
4 5 € 3.5 € 2 € 0 €   
5 5 € 3.5 € 2.5 € 1.5 € 0 €  
6 5 € 4 € 3 € 2 € 1 € 0 € 
 
Large group sessions 
Rank / 
Participants 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
6 5 € 4 € 3 € 2 € 1 €        
7 5 € 4 € 3.5 € 3 € 2 € 1 €       
8 5 € 4 € 3.5 € 3 € 2 € 1.5 € 1 €      
9 5 € 4.5 € 4 € 3.5 € 3 € 2.5 € 2 € 1 €     
10 5 € 4.5 € 4 € 3.5 € 3 € 2.5 € 2 € 1.5 € 1 €    
11 5 € 4.5 € 4 € 3.5 € 3 € 2.5 € 2 € 1.5 € 1 € 0.5 €   
12 5 € 4.5 € 4 € 3.5 € 3 € 2.5 € 2 € 1.5 € 1 € 0.5 € 0.5 €  
 
On your table you will find: 
 One envelope with a sheet showing two different Sudokus to be solved during the experiment. Once the 
experiment starts you are allowed to open the envelope. 
 One pencil 
 One rubber 
 One red card 
 One instruction sheet how to solve a Sudoku  
 
Please check if all mentioned items are provided. 
Now you have 3 minutes to read the instruction how to solve a Sudoku on the other side of this sheet. The 
instructor will give a sign when the experiment starts and you are allowed to open the envelope. 
 
GOOD LUCK! 
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How to play Sudoku 
The Sudoku grid consists of thirty-six squares in a six by six grid. To solve the Sudoku, each square in the grid 
must contain a number between one and six, with the following conditions: 
 Each row of six cells must contain each of the numbers from 1 to 6 once and only once. 
 Each column of six cells must contain each of the numbers from 1 to 6 once and only once. 
 Each of the six 3 by 2 boxes of six cells must contain each of the numbers from 1 to 6 once and only 
once. 
The Sudoku starts with a partially filled grid and you must complete the grid while following the rules above. If 
you complete the grid, you've solved the Sudoku. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
1 6 
4 
2 6 3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
4 
6 
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A2 - Experimental instructions - Exam 
Welcome to the practice exam in ‚Economics of Entrepreneurship‘.  
 
From now on, please be completely silent and refrain from any sort of verbal or non-verbal communication with 
others. Please also switch off your mobile phones if you have not already done so. No books, notes or other 
materials are allowed during the exam. We will not count your practice exam and you will not receive bonus 
points if you do not comply with these rules. 
 
There are two envelopes in front of you. Do not open them before I tell you to do so. 
 
The large envelope contains the practice exam. The practice exam consists of 15 multiple choice questions with 
four answers to each question. Only one of the answers is completely correct. You can earn up to 5 bonus points 
if you answer all questions correctly. When you are finished with the exam, put it back into the envelope and 
check the watch to remember how long you needed to complete the questions (Instruction for supervisor: 
point to watch in the room now). I will not answer any questions regarding the content of the practice exam. 
 
The small envelope in front of you contains a short questionnaire that we ask you to complete after you are 
finished with the practice exam. You are not required to fill out this questionnaire. However, if you do, we will 
pay you 5 EUR at the end of the session and we will use your responses for a research project that is currently 
conducted at Erasmus University. Your answers to this questionnaire will be processed completely 
anonymously and we will make sure that your answers will not be connected to your name by anyone. In 
particular, I – the supervisor – will not see or learn about your responses in the questionnaire at any time.  
 
If you do not want to fill out the questionnaire, please return your practice exam to me when you are finished 
and quietly leave the room. You may wait outside if you want to know your exam result. I will grade all practice 
exams quickly after everyone is finished and has left the room and I will tell you your results after a few 
minutes, if you are interested. We will also announce the results on Blackboard later. 
 
If you do fill out the questionnaire, please put it back into the small envelope when you have completed all 
questions, seal the envelope and remain silent in your seat until everyone is finished. When everyone is finished, 
I will come around to pay you the 5 EUR for participating in the research project and I will ask you to sign a list 
to confirm you have received the payment. 
After this, I will ask everyone to leave the room and I will grade the practice exams. When I am finished, you 
can come in again and I will tell you your result. This will complete this session. 
 
Do you have any questions at this point? 
 
You can now open the large envelope and start with the practice exam. Good luck! 
 
(Instruction to supervisor: Check the watch now and write down starting time of exam on the blackboard 
behind you!) 
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A3 - Post-experimental questionnaire – Sudoku 1 
Please answer the questions below truthfully. When you are finished, put the sheet back into the envelope and 
return it to the supervisor of the experiment. Your answers are treated completely anonymously and will be 
processed independently of your name.  
 
1) What is your age in years? ____________ 
 
2) What is your highest educational achievement until now? Please mark one: 
 
O Some secondary schooling 
O Secondary school degree (e.g. high school, vmbo, havo, vwo) 
O HBO or Bachelor’s degree  
O Master’s degree 
O PhD 
O Other, not applicable 
 
3) What is currently your main occupational status? Mark all that apply: 
 
O Student 
O Employee (part-time or full-time) 
O Self-employed (part-time or full-time) 
O Unemployed 
O Housewife, househusband, home maker 
O Retired 
O Disabled 
O Other, not applicable 
 
4) Have you solved sudokus before? 5) What is your current relationship status? 
 
O Yes    O Single  O In a relationship 
O No    O Married  O Divorced 
O Don’t remember   O Widowed O Other, not applicable 
 
6) Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements on the 5-point scale below where 1 
means “strongly disagree” and 5 means “strongly agree”: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
a) I am usually good with numbers and math O O O O O 
b) I enjoy solving puzzles and riddles O O O O O 
c) I find intelligence an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
d) I find ambition an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
e) I find diligence an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
f) I tried really hard to solve the sudokus correctly and as fast as possible O O O O O 
g) I find myself physically attractive and good-looking O O O O O 
h) I am intelligent O O O O O 
i) I am ambitious O O O O O 
j) I am diligent  O O O O O 
k) Intelligence is important for solving sudokus fast O O O O O 
l) Sudokus become easier to solve with experience and practice O O O O O 
m) Puzzles and riddles are cool O O O O O 
n) I was strongly motivated by the money in this experiment O O O O O 
o) I am currently in love. O O O O O 
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A4 - Post-experimental questionnaire – Exam experiment 
Please answer the questions below truthfully. When you are finished, put the sheet back into the small envelope 
and return it to the supervisor of the experiment. Your answers are treated completely anonymously and will be 
processed by two different people to ensure that they will not be connected at any point with your name. In 
particular, the supervisor will not see or learn about your responses to this questionnaire at any time. 
 
1) How many minutes after the start of the practice exam did you put your answers back into the envelope? 
(please check the watch and be accurate)   ______________ 
2) What is your age in years? ____________ 
3) What is currently your occupational status? Mark all that apply: 
O Student 
O Employee (part-time or full-time) 
O Self-employed (part-time or full-time) 
O Unemployed 
O Housewife, househusband, home maker 
O Other, not applicable 
4) Have you participated in an Economics of Entrepreneurship exam before?  
O Yes     
O No     
5) What is your current relationship status? 
O Single  O In a relationship 
O Married  O Divorced 
O Widowed O Other, not applicable 
6) Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements on the 5-point scale below where 1 
means “strongly disagree” and 5 means “strongly agree”: 
  1 2 3 4 5 
a) I usually receive high grades at university O O O O O 
b) I enjoy this course O O O O O 
c) I find intelligence an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
d) I find ambition an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
e) I find diligence an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
f) I tried really hard to solve the exam correctly O O O O O 
g) I find myself physically attractive and good-looking O O O O O 
h) I am intelligent O O O O O 
i) I am ambitious O O O O O 
j) I am diligent  O O O O O 
k) Intelligence is important for solving this exam O O O O O 
l) This type of exam becomes easier to solve with experience and practice O O O O O 
m) Economics is cool O O O O O 
n) Entrepreneurship as an occupation is cool O O O O O 
o) Entrepreneurship as an academic subject is cool O O O O O 
p) I was strongly motivated by the bonus points for this practice exam O O O O O 
q) I am currently in love O O O O O 
r) I find the supervisor of this exam is good looking O O O O O 
s) I would say “yes” if the supervisor would ask me out on a romantic date O O O O O 
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7) Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements on the 5-point scale below where 1 
means “strongly disagree” and 5 means “strongly agree”: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
a) I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic O O O O O 
b) I see myself as critical, quarrelsome O O O O O 
c) I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined O O O O O 
d) I see myself as anxious, easily upset O O O O O 
e) I see myself as open to new experiences, complex O O O O O 
f) I see myself as reserved, quiet O O O O O 
g) I see myself as sympathetic, warm O O O O O 
h) I see myself as disorganized, careless O O O O O 
i) I see myself as calm, emotionally stable O O O O O 
j) I see myself as conventional, uncreative O O O O O 
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A5 - Post-experimental questionnaire – Sudoku 2 
Please check if the session and your participant number (the number on your seat) are filled in above. Next, 
please answer the questions below truthfully. When you are finished, put the sheet back into the envelope, seal it 
and return it to the supervisor of the experiment. Your answers are treated completely anonymously and will be 
processed independently of your name. In particular, the supervisor will not see or learn about your responses to 
this questionnaire at any time. 
1) Please mark the classes you have participated in this academic year (2009-2010). 
 
O Introduction to Entrepreneurship, Strategy, and Organization Economics (FEB13044) 
O Economics of Innovation (FEM11011) 
 
2) What is your age in years? ____________ 
 
3) What is your highest educational achievement until now? Please mark one: 
 
O Some secondary schooling 
O Secondary school degree (e.g. high school, vmbo, havo, vwo) 
O HBO or Bachelor’s degree  
O Master’s degree 
O PhD 
O Other, not applicable 
 
4) What is currently your main occupational status? Mark all that apply: 
 
O Student 
O Employee (part-time or full-time) 
O Self-employed (part-time or full-time) 
O Unemployed 
O Housewife, househusband, home maker 
O Retired 
O Disabled 
O Other, not applicable 
 
5) Have you solved Sudokus before? Please mark one:  
 
O No     
O Yes, once 
O Yes, a few times 
O Yes, often     
O Don’t remember    
 
6) What is your current relationship status? 
 
O Single  O In a relationship 
O Married  O Divorced 
O Widowed O Other, not applicable 
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7) Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements on the 5-point scale below where 1 
means “strongly disagree” and 5 means “strongly agree”: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
a) I am usually good with numbers and math O O O O O 
b) I enjoy solving puzzles and riddles O O O O O 
c) I find intelligence an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
d) I find ambition an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
e) I find diligence an attractive attribute in a sexual partner O O O O O 
f) I tried really hard to solve the Sudokus correctly and as fast as possible O O O O O 
g) I find myself physically attractive and good-looking O O O O O 
h) I am intelligent O O O O O 
i) I am ambitious O O O O O 
j) I am diligent  O O O O O 
k) Intelligence is important for solving Sudokus fast O O O O O 
l) Sudokus become easier to solve with experience and practice O O O O O 
m) Puzzles and riddles are cool O O O O O 
n) I was strongly motivated by the money / course credit for this experiment O O O O O 
o) I am currently in love O O O O O 
p) I find the supervisor of this experiment is good looking O O O O O 
q) I would say “yes” if the supervisor would ask me out on a romantic date O O O O O 
 
8) Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements on the 5-point scale below where 1 
means “strongly disagree” and 5 means “strongly agree”: 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
a) I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic O O O O O 
b) I see myself as critical, quarrelsome O O O O O 
c) I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined O O O O O 
d) I see myself as anxious, easily upset O O O O O 
e) I see myself as open to new experiences, complex O O O O O 
f) I see myself as reserved, quiet O O O O O 
g) I see myself as sympathetic, warm O O O O O 
h) I see myself as disorganized, careless O O O O O 
i) I see myself as calm, emotionally stable O O O O O 
j) I see myself as conventional, uncreative O O O O O 
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